Herminius provided an update. In Iran and Eritrea, scores were up for expropriation. Iran was expected to pressure vessels without using kinetic force, having recently held three Azerbaijani vessels for five months.

In the Middle East, ceasefires were in place in Lebanon and Gaza, and the civil war in Syria had recently ended. A Houthi ceasefire was pending, with no current targeting of vessels. Iran had not retaliated against Israel, in part due to the weakened state of its proxies. In Sudan, forces had withdrawn from Port Sudan. The Singapore Strait was experiencing a marked rise in robberies of stores and spares from vessels.

In the DRC, unrest was not expected to spread offshore. The M23 were testing boundaries. EU funding to Rwanda may be withdrawn.

In the Mediterranean, four vessels had been damaged by limpet mines, one loading in Ust-Luga and three in ballast. Most were part of the so-called shadow fleet. While Ukraine was suspected, attribution was not definitive. It was thought Ukraine might increasingly target oil exports and supporting vessels, with sabotage possible from Tripoli to the Baltic. Some mines had 365-day fuses, raising the possibility of losses occurring anywhere.

There was no clear peace proposal for Ukraine and no input from Russia. The US appeared to have accepted the Russian framing of the conflict, and its influence over Ukraine could diminish if aid or support were reduced. The EU continued to provide financial support, with Ukraine sourcing supplies from India. Most of Ukraine’s armoury was domestically produced, often with European seed funding.

No changes were proposed to the Listed Areas.

Under AOB, it was agreed to establish a working group on wordings, noting that adoption of any changes would require reinsurer support. Consideration was also given to holding a JWC forum.